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I. Inuoduction and Historical
Contexr Up to the Year 2000
In the summer 2000 issue of
Trial Trends, the author wrote an
article entitled "Development and
Status of fnsurance Bad Faith in
Montana."2 The article recounted the
history of insurance bad faith in
Montana reviewing its common law
and statutory development and at-
tempted to set forth the status of
insurance bad faith at the millennium.
In the intervening seven years,
the state and federal courts in
Montana have issued upwards of
tweflty decisions adding to Montana,s
bad faith jurisprudence. Hence, ir is
time to reflect on the continuing
development of the tort of insurance
bad faith in Montana since the mil-
lennium. This work, when coupled
with the odginal arricle, is desþed
to provide the reader with a broad
understanding of the borders of
insurance bad faith in Montana to
date.
A. A Short History and
Development of fnsurance Bad
Faith to 20003
Jessen u. ODaniel,a was Judge
Jameson's 1962 landmark federal
decision which recognized an action
for exúa-con trac¡taJ, damages against
an insurer for bteach of its duty to
setde a claim for the benefìt of its
insured. That same year, in Il/esfatl u.
Motors Ins. Corp., the Montana Su-
preme Court held that punitive dam-
ages v/ere not an available remedy for
breach of contract even if the breach
was willfi¡l or fraudulent.s However,
in State ex rel. l_,ar¡on u. District Coart
of the Eigltth Judicial Dist.,6 rn 1967,
the court made an exception to the
lWufall t,ie that allowed damages
where breach of an insurance con-
tract was a-lso a violation of the Mon-
tana insurance code. Montana had
adopted irs insurance code in 1959.7
However, the code would not contain
the Unfair Claim Settlement pracrices
Act provisions (UTPA) untsl 1977.8
Nevertheless , Larson ushered in a
nev/ era of bad faith actions based in
statute and referted to as "tortious
breach of the insurance code.,, More-
over, in 1.977, Montana adopted the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
provisions of the code, a statement
of foureen practices prohibited for
insurers.e Much of insurance bad
faith would ultimateþ have its basis
in that statute, and counsel began to
use it as their primary source of du-
ties which might provide a basis for a
claim of insurance bad faith.
By 1,982, the cases of lWeber u.
Blue Cross of Montanal\ and Lipinski u.
Title Ins. C0.,11 established that there
existed in Montana a common law
tort of bad faith independent of the
insurance contract and independent
of statute.
Third-party bad faith appeared in
Montana with the decision of Khudt
u. Flin,k n 197912 which followed the
California Supreme Cout's landmark
1979 decision in Royl Globe In¡. Co. u.
Søþerior Court of Butte Coørufl.13 Klaudt
held that a third-party claimant in
Montana could have a dkect private
civil right of action against an insurer
fot breach of $ 33-18-201, MCA, of
the UTPA. Hence, third-party victims
could bring bad faith cÌaims against
the tottfeasor's insurer for violating
the UTPA while handling third-party
claims.
In1984, the Montana Supreme
Court, in Gibsoø u. IYestern Fire Ins.
Co.,la determined that the insurance
contract contains an "implied obliga-
tion of good faith and fut deating by
a fìduciary bound by a duty of high-
est good fatth." The Gibson case was
based entirely on judicially created
princþles of bad faith and nor on the
UTPA.
In 1987, while riding the tide of
"tort reform," the Montana legisla-
ture attempted to substantially restrict
insurance bad taith by replacing it
with a statutory "independent cause
of action."ls The statutory indepen-
dent cause of action, along with
breach of contract and fraud were
apparcnùy intended to be the only
remedies allowed for an insurer,s
breach. The statute restricted statutes
of limitations for the independent
claimsld and provided an absolute
defense if the insurer "had a reasorì-
able basis in law or in fact for con-
testing the claim or the amount of
the claim whichever is in issue.,,17
At the same time, the legislature
reformed the state's punitive damage
statute to require that punitive dam-
ages be proved in a hearing separate
from trial by clear and convincing
evidence and actual, as opposed to
implied, malice.18 However, in doing
so, the legislature also adopted the
standard for determining actual mal-
ice from Owens a. Parker Drilling Co.1e
(1984) that was more consumer-
friendly than the old sratutory stan-
dard of "malicious, fiaudulent of
oppressive."
The broad concept of contract
bad faith was dealt a blow in 1990 in
Story u Ci4t of Boqeman in which the
Montana Supteme Court held that
there was no cause of action for bad
fasth fot breach of a conftact in Mon-
tana even if the breach was inten-
tional or malicious.2o The court
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reasoned that every contract involved
a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, so that breach of that cov-
enant was just a contract breach
and would not support a tort claim.
Howevet, the court recognized an
exception for "special circumstances."
Special cfucumstances existed where
one pârty to a contract had the
greater bargaining po\¡r''er, the other
party sought security or Peace of
mind in the contract, and ordinarY
contract damages wefe not an ad-
equate remedy. Subsequently, Stephens
u. Safeco lrus. Co. of America2l and
Thoruas a. Northwester National Insørance
C0.22 (1.998) applied those Storl cnte-
ria to the telationship between an
insuted and an insuret and held that
the insured/insurer telationship is a
special circumstance in which the
insurer is in a fiduciary capacity to
the insured. Hence, breach of con-
tractby the insuret could support a
claim of bad taith tort for bteach of
the insurance contract.
Court decisions poked some
substantial holes in the 1987
legislature's attempted statutory
restriction of bad fatth.In 1'993,
the court tn OTallon u. Farmers Ins.
Exch,23 held that claims âdiusters
could be sued outside S 33-18-242,
MCrA,, since the statute only restricted
actions against "insureÍs." It Tbornas
u. Northwestern National Irtsørance Co.'24
(1998) the coutt held that insurer
conduct not involved in the "han-
dting of an insurance clalm" was not
governed by $ 33-18-242, MCA, so
that the carrier's wrongful conduct
in handling of the application and
renewal process could suppoft a tott
claim for bad faith. The court in
Thomas reconfìrmed that insurers
have a duty to act in good faith, and
said that duty still exists independent
of the insurance contract and statute.
The court said such common law
claims exist jnsofar as they are not in
conflict with $ 33-1'8-242, MC,\.
Thomas made clear rhat ñrst-PartY
common law bad faith is still alive to
redress the insurer's wrongful
conduct which is not Part of the
handling of insurance claims.
The greatest rþ in the statutet
fabric was the coutt's holding in
Brewington u. Emplolter Fire Ins. Co.zs
jn 1.999, which established that the
UT?Â, by its terms, did not preemPt
common law claims for third-Party
bad faith. The court noted that sub-
section (3) of the act which limited
actions against the insurers to breach
of contract, fraud, or the specified
independent actions, by its language,
applied only to an "insuted" claimant
and did not mefltion third-PartY
claimants.
Finally, in this teview, the court
in Safeco Ins. Co. u. Montana 8ú Jadicial
Dist Court,26 (2000) held that a de-
clxatory action to enforce advance
payment of medical exPenses under
Rìdte1 u. Gøøranfl Nat'l Ins. Cqn is rtot
batred by the UTPA and may be
brought before the undedying claim
has been disposed of by settlement
or judgment. Hence, actions to
enforce or clarify rights could be
brought anytime so long as they
do not seek bad faith damages for
violation of the UTPA.
B. Summary of Bad Faith
Insurance Law at the Millennium
At the millennium, then, Mon-
tana law had established that insurers
owed a duty of good faith and tait
deaüng both to their insureds and to
third-patty claimants independent of
contract or statute. The relationship
between insurer and insured was
identified as a "special relationship"
in which the insurer has a fiduciary
responsibilty to the insured which
will support a tort action for bad
faith if the contract is breached.
Montana recognized both common
law and statutory actions for insur-
ance bad faith. First-party insureds
could only bring breach of conttact,
ftaud, and statutory "independent"
actions for wrongful conduct of the
insurer in handling claims but could
press common law bad faith ac-
tions for the insurer's conduct
involved in the application, con-
tracting, and renewal ptocess. Third
parties could bring common law
bad faith actions for any wrongful
conduct of the insuter or could
avail themselves of the same statu-
tory remedies as first Parries.
Finally, patties could avail them-
selves of declaratory actions to en-
force or clarify rights and duties
during the pendency of the claims,
and such declaratoty actions were not
barred by the UTPA. Montana law is
unique insofar as third-party actions
against insurers under the UTPA are
now codifìed. Such third-party rights
nevet existed in other states or were
the subject of common law that has
been overturned.2s Punitive damages
are allowed under both common law
and statutory bad fa:th2e actions in
Montana. Finally, insureds in statu-
tory actions under MCÂ S 33-1'8-242
(2) need not prove that the insurer's
misconduct is a "general business
practice" as required under $ 33-1'8-
201, MC,\. All of the propositions
stated in this short summary conlinue
to be true of Montana law as this
article is written.
II. Fout General Categories for
Anaþsis of Bad Faith Cases Sincé
2000
Cases petinent to the law of
insutance bad faith and decided by
Montana state and federal courts
since 2000 and can be arbitrarily
grouped into four general categories
helpful fot discussion. First, there are
the cases developing the insuter's
duty to make advance payments.
Breach of that duty quickly becomes
grounds for a declaratory judgment
action and bad faith claims in Mon-
tana. Second, the Montana SuPteme
Court has issued impottant decisions
delineating the role and limits of
àttorney fees as a remedy in enforcing
the duties of the insurers.
Third, the boundaries of the
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insurer's "reasonable basis" defense
under $ 33-18-242(5), MC,\, are
being developed and are worth ana-
lyzing here. Finally, there are a hand-
ful of important decisions involving
such topics as wrongful conduct of
insurance g)annqr funds, ERISA,
"comparative bad faith," and statutes
of limitations in bad faith actions
that merit coverage here. This aticle
will examine each of these areas.
A. Duty of Insurers to Advance
Pay Damages
1. History of the Duty: The
RidlsJ and Dabray Cases
Montana state and federal courts
have developed rþorous require-
ments for advance payment by insur-
ers of certain expenses and damages
suffered by third-party claimants.
Judicial tecognition of this set of
duties owed by the insurer to third
parties has made advance payment
issues a primary source of bad faith
claims. Recall that in 1997, in the
landmark decision of Ndþy a. Guaran-
tue Nat'l Ins. Co.,3o the Montana Su-
preme Court held that, where liabüit¡r
is reasonably clea4 an insurer has an
obligation to pay the third party
claimant's medical expenses as in-
curred. The court reasoned that the
claims industry practice of refusing
to advance medical expenses pending
full settlement was "leveraging2'
which was a practice violating two
provisions of the UT?,\:31
(6) neglect to attempt in good
faith to effectuate prompt, fair,
and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has
become reasonably clear;
*x*.
(13) fail to promptly settle
claims, if liability has become
reasonably clear, under one
portion of the insutance poJicy
coverage in order to influence
settlements under other por-
tions of the insurance policy
covefage.
In Dubrq u. Farmers In¡arance
Exchange,32 in 2001, the court ex-
tended Ndlel's advance expenses duty
to include lost wages. Dubray had
brought a declaratoty action under
Safeco Ins. Co. u. District Court,33 to
make Farmets continue advance
payment of medical expenses pursu-
ant to Ndlel as well as lost wages and
included à prayer for relief for "pain
and discomfort, mental distress, in-
convenience, and punitive damages."
The district court dismissed the de-
clatatoty action às "afl insurance bad
faith claim in disguise." However, the
Montana Supreme Court, while up-
holding the dismissal with regard to
"pain and discomfort, mental distress,
inconvenience, and punitive dam-
ages," held it error to dismiss claims
for payment of damages such as
medical expenses and lost wages
about v¡hich liability is reasonably
clear and not barred by $ 33-1.8-242
(6) þ), MCA. The court said:
Nothing n Ndlry suggests that
its scope should be categori-
cally limited to medical ex-
penses. Rather, medical
expenses are just one of the
obligations incurred by victims
that mandatory liability insur-
ance laws were desþed to
alleviate. Lost wages which are
reasonably certain and direcdy
related to an insured's negJi-
gence of wrongful actate
another example.
***
The essence of our holding
in Ridle1is that where liability
is reasonably clear, injured
victims are entitled to payment
of those damages which are
not reasonably in dispute with-
out ftst executìng a settlement
agreement and final release.
The courts will continue to
define the duty to make advance
payments. Clearly, Døbrq is not just
Iimited to lost wages but includes
"those damages which are not
reasonably in dispute" which means
that such things as travel expense
and home care should be the subject
of a duty to make advance pa)¡ment.
2. The \Vaners Case and
Settlement Without a Release
Given the scope and size of
damages subject to advance payment,
the insurer's immediate concern has
become obtaining a lelease for their
insured before their limit is paid out
in advance payments. The reader
should note here that, in 2000, the
court in IYalters u. Guaranþt Nat'l In¡.
Co,3a held that auto insuters could not
demand a telease in clear JiabiJity
cases where the claimant's damages
clearþ exceeded a minìmum limit
($25,000) BI coverage. The court
held that demanding a release in that
circumstance u/as an unfair trade
practice as a violation of the duty "to
effectuate prompt, far and equitable
settlements of claims" under $ 33-
1.8-242(6), MCA. Just as importantly,
the court held it was notper sebàd
faith for an insurer to pay out the
$25,000 BI limit to a clatmant with-
out getting a release for its insured
given that the insured had no reason-
able expectation of negotiating a
release with a minimum Jimit policy.
3. Duty to Advance Pay Without a
Release Even Where the Claimant
Refused a Limits Offer
In2002, in the clear Jiability case
of Etter u. Safeco In¡. Co. of lllinois,3s
the insurer offered the auto Bodily
Injuty coverage limit of $100,000
conditioned on signing of a full
telease. The claimant, Etter, refused,
counter offering at $850,000. Safeco
then refused to advance pay $60,000
in medical expenses under Ndlel
contending that, under the 1992 deci-
sion of Jaedemøn u. National Farr¿ers
Union,36 plaintiff's refusal of limits
telieved them of that duty. Çuedenaru
had held that, whete the claimant
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refused to sþ a release, hets was not
an offer of "settlement," and the
insuret had no duty to accept it.)
The Federal District Coutt in
Etterheld that clatnant's refusal to
settle for policy limits does not
relieve the carrier of the duty to
advance pay medical expenses undet
Ndley Accotdingly, Safeco's failure to
advance the medical expenses was
bad faith. The court reasoned that
Safeco was obligated to pay so long
as: (1) liabiJity is reasonably clear, and
(2) the expense is causally related to
the accident. The court asserted that
to refuse Ndlel payments in that
situation was leveraging. The court
said whether Safeco could condition
a BI limits offer on signing of a
release u¡as not the issue in the case.
They simply had a duty to advance
pay the medicals regardless of the
telease.
4. Duty to Advance Pay Beyond
Minimum Limits
It is now clear that an insurer
-¡¡hich has a policy whose limits are
greater than the mandatory minimum
must pay advance expenses under
Ndlel and Dabrq up to the limits of
its coverage without the benefit of a
release. Shilhanek u. D-2 Trøcking, Inc.
37 
Q003), involved the insuter's duty
to advance pay medicals beyond the
minimum mandatory limits of liabil-
ity and raised the issue of whether an
insurer's refusal to do so is bad taith.
The insurer contended that the duty
to advance pay without a release only
arises under the minimum limits of
the Motor Vehicle ResponsibiÏty Act,
S 61-6-103(2), MCA. The court dis-
agreed saying, "\X/e further conclude
that, to the extent that there is lan-
guage in Walters that might be read
to imply that the insurer's obligation
under Ridley is limited to the mini-
mum coverage required by the
MVRÂ, thatlang,nge is overruled."
The coutt held that failute to pay
undisputed medical expense in
advance up to the limits of the
tortfeasor's coverage without a
release js a violatjon of $ 33-18-201
(6) and (13), MCA, (1997). Q',lotably,
rn the S hilhanek case, the court ulti-
mately absolved the insurer of bad
fattt' for conditioning payment on a
firll telease, because Jaedenan (1,992)
had held it permissible for a carrier to
condition settlement upon a release
of claims against its insured, and
IYatters (2000), was not yet the law
when the insurer acted.) Hence, un-
der $ 33-18-242 (5), MCA, the carriet
had "a reasonable basis in lav¡ or
fact" for contesting the claim at rhat
time. Today, if liability is clear and
damages clearþ exceed the minimum
limits of BI coverage, it would be
bad faith to condition aàvance pay-
ments on a release of the insured
from liabiJity even whete liability
limits exceed the minimum.
5. Duty to Advance Pay Without
an ttAdvance Pay Agreementt'
After Shilbanek, the question
became whether the insurer could
make the clunant stgn an advance
pay agreement before payng medical
expense. The Federal Court in Bargett
u. Safeco National Ins. C0.38 Q003),
ruled that, under Shilhane,ë in Mon-
tana, fhe third party insurer jn a clear
liabiJity accident with undisputed
damages cannot demand that the
claimant sþ an advance pay 
^gree-
ment before pâl¡g advance medical
expense. The insurer has a duty to
pay 
^n 
injured third party's undis-
puted medical expenses, up to the
limits of its coverage and without the
benefit of a settlement agreement.
6. Duty to Advance Pay Under
CGL and Flomeownets Policies?
The question yet to be decided
by the courts is whethet Ndle1 and
Dwbrry apply to such casualty cover-
ages as Commercial General LiabiJity
(CGL) and Homeowner Liability
policies. Both decisions are based in
judicial interpretations of the UTPA,
S 33-18-201, MCA, but they also
discuss public policy as exptessed in
the Mandatory Liability Protection
Act, $ 61.-6-301,, MCA, which applies
only to auto insurance. Nevertheless,
the reasoning of each decision
could as easily apply to CGL and
Homeowner's policies and one could
reasonably predict that the court
would extend the duty to pay to
those policies. One insurance defense
lawyer reported to the author that he
advises CGL carriers that the court
will likely extend the duty to CGL
coverage, but that it should not be
bad faith to refuse the duty until the
court does so.
B. Attorney Fees as Remedies in
Insurance Actions
L. Attotney Fees in Insurance
Declaratory Actions
Court development of attorney
fees as a remedy in insurance cases
since the millennium is also substan-
tial and merits reviev¡ here. In 2003,
'tn Trø¡tæs of Indiana Uniuersi4t u.
Buxbaønfe the coutt granted attorney
fees to third parties who prevailed
against a self-insured institution in a
coverage dispute. Inpart, the case is
important, because it v/as later cited
by the Montana Supreme Court in
Moantøin IWest Farm Børeaø Mat. Ins.
Co. u. Brewerao (2003) as legal ground
for awarding attorney fees to a pte-
vailng third-party in an insurance
declantoty action.
In the Indianø Uniuersiry case,
three Indiana University students and
another Indtana resident were in-
volved in the tollover of a Chevrolet
Suburban owned by Indiana Univer-
siry and operated in Montana on a
summer research ptoject. Three
deaths and a serious injury resulted.
In the ensuing lawsuit, the estate of
the driver, Jones, demanded defense
and indemnity ftom Indiana Univer-
sity, a self-insurer. Multiple issues
developed regarding the University's
duty to indemnify the responsible
driveq the University's status as an
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insufet, and coverage.
Indiana University brought a
declaratory action against the Jones
estate and the estate of deceased
passenger, IGueger, to resolve the
issues. The estates, which sought
defense and indemnity coverage
from Indiana University, prevailed in
the coverage dispute fìled by the
University but were confronted with
multiple problems in recovering
attorney fees. For example, Indiana
University was self-insured, so it was '
not an insurance company and did
not have an insurance policy contract
with the party demanding defense.
Accordingly, the insurance exception
to the ,\merican Rule did not apply to
provide alegù basis for attotney fees.
After denying cross motions for
summary judgment, the coutt heard
the matter in non-juty tial and found
for the estates over the University
of Indiana. The judge awarded the
estates their costs, expenses and
attorney fees but later altered the
judgment to delete those amounts
on the ground that there wâs no
contractual or statutory basis for
such an award. The issue on appeal
was rvhether the District Court erred
when it denied the prevailing estates
their attorney fees under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Äct. The
court held attorney fees could be
awarded under the "supplemental
relief" pottion of $ 27-8-313, MC,\,
of the Unifotm Declaratory Judg-
ments Act.
The court rejected the argument
that it could 
^ward 
àttorney fees as
"costs" under $ 27-8-31,1, MCrA., of
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act, since ample ptecedent estab-
lishes that attorney fees and costs are
two different remedies in Montana.
However, the court found that attor-
ney fees could be awarded as
"supplemental relief" under $ 27-8-
313, MC¿{., of the ,\ct which
provides:
Further relief based on a
declarutory fudgment or decree
may be grantetl whenever
necessary or proper. The appli-
cation therefore shall be by
petition to a court having
jurisdictìon to grant the relief.
If the application be deemed
sufficient, the court shall, on
reasonable notice, require any
adverse party whose rights
have been adjudicated by a
declaratory judgment or dectee
to show cause why further
relief should not be granted
forthwith.
The court overruled its decisions
tn State ex rel. Deþt. of Health and
Environmental Sdenæ¡ u. I-;incoln
Counlra1 McKarnel u. State,az and
Dorwart u, Carawal,a3 insofar as
they held thete is no provision fot
àn 
^ward 
of attorney fees in a
declaratory judgment action.
Under the Indiana Uniuersiry case,
the former "frivolous ot malicious"
requirement for attorney fees is aban-
doned if the fees are sought under
the "supplemental relief " ptorrision
of the Uniform Declaratoty Judg-
ment Act, S 27-8-313, MCA. Award
of attorney fees under that pfovision
only requires a showing of "neces-
sary or proper" under the following
guidelines suggested by the court:
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1, "Anomalous result" circum-
stance in which, without an
attorney fee award, the insured
"would have been worse off
than if a declatation of their
rights had never been made."
i.e., without attorney fees in
the declaratoty action, having
to bring abad fatth suit to be
made whole.
2. \ù7hen no other alternative
is available. If the insured
must file a declaratory action
to obtain the benefit of the
insurance, then attorney fees
are necessary and proper.
3. If the declaratory action
is filed "for purely tacttca)
feasons," attofney fees may
not be appropriate.
2. Attorney Fees in Declaratory
Actions by the Third-Party
Claimant
Moøntain IYut Farm Børeaa Mut
Ins. Co. u. Brewer, involved attotney
fees where a third-party prevailed in a
dispute over indemnity. The parents
of the injuted minor passenger,
Angie Chdstenson, successfully
ptessed the third-par ty declantory
action to enforce coverage of the
toftfeasof by Mountain NØest. Having
prevailed, they sought attorney fees
and costs under dual theories that
(1) the insurance exception to the
,{.merican Rule should be expanded
to provide attorney fees to an injured
third party who prevails in an insur-
ance coverage action against a motor
vehicle insurer, and (2) the "supple-
mental relief" provision of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
S 27-8-31,3, MCA, allows an award of
attorney fees to the thitd party pre-
vailng in such a declaratory action,
On appeal, the Montana Supreme
Court said, "\We hold that an insured
is entitled to recover attorney fees,
Pufsuant to the insurance exception
to the American Rule, when the
insurer forces the insured to assume
the burden of legal action to obtain
the full benefìt of the insurance
contract, regardless of whether the
insurer's duty to defend is at issue."
The court expressly rejected the
"tfanspafent" distinction betv¡een an
insurer's refusal to defend, for which
common law allowed attorney fees,
and a denial of coverage for indem-
nity, for which the courts traditionally
have refused àttoÍÍrcy fees. In Mon-
tana, Yo;uish u. USAA,Mhad deferred
to the legislature instead of changing
the rule, and the court in Brewer
recanted that deferral and overruled
Youish.
Howevet, the court would not
expand the Insurance Exception to
the r\merican Rule to include attor-
ney fees fot third-party claimants
who had no contractual relationship
with the insutet involved. The court
considered the absence of the tradi-
tional contractual relationship in
third-party cases and found there was
no exploitation of inherently unequal
batgaining power in such situations,
nor was thete ftustration of any
"justi{ìable expectation of insurance
protection" held by the injured third
party. Moreover, the court refused
Christenson's contention that, by
enacting compulsory motor vehicle
liabiJity insurance, the legislature set
a pubJic policy to "extend the dght
to enforce the insurance contract to
injured persons, not just insureds"
thereby raising a justifiable or reason-
able expectation on the part of the
third patty of creating a sort of third-
party benefìcial interest in the cover-
age. This holding is consistent with
those of other jurisdictions on the
issue,
Howevet, the court asserted that
its holding "does not leave the
Christensons without tecourse in
their attempt to recover their attorney
fees." The court cited the then re-
cently decidedTrastees of Indiana
Uniuersiry case and said, "$ 27-8-31.3,
MCA, authorizes a court to award
attorneys fees when the court, in its
disctetion, deems such an award
'necessaty and proper."'The court
remanded Brewer to the District Court
for a determination of whether attor-
ney fees and costs were "necessary or
proper," and in what amount.
Counsel should note the breadth
of the holding that would appear to
apply "when the insurer forces the
insured to assume the burden of
legal action to obtain the full benefit
of the insurance contract, regardless
of whether the insuret's duty to
defend is at issue." Does the holding
apply to any benefìt or just the ben-
efìt of indemnity? ,\re "benefit" and
"indemnity" interchangeable in this
context since an insurance benefit
indemnifies the insured for loss? The
language is not restricted, and the
court could easily have limited the
award to legal actions to obtain
defense or indemnity under liability
policies. The problem being remedied
in the holding is forcing the insured
"to assume the burden of legal action
to obtain the full benefit of the insur-
ance contract." That problem exists
in many situations where the benefit
is neither defense nor indemnity for
Jiabiliry.
3. No Attorney Fees as Damages
in Montana UTPA Actions
Insurance claimants in third-party
bad faith cases were dealt ahard
blow in Sampnn u. Nationøl Farøers
Union Proþ. dy Cas. Co.as in 2006.
There, the court held that 
^ttorney
fees ate not recoverable as damages
in an action brought under Montana's
Unfair Trade Practices Act, $$ 33-18-
201 and242,MCA. Sampson and
Cebulski wete injured when a car.
driven by Langberg collided with
theirs. Their þro bono attor:ney offered
to settle their claims for $125,000.
Langberg's insurer, NFU, tefused.
Claimants hired counsel experienced
in personal injury claims and settled
the case for $125,000 two years later
after incurring $43,000 in attorney
fees. They then brought action
against NFU solely for their attorfley
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fees for NFU's violation of the
UTPA, S 33-18-201(6), MCA,
claiming NFU neglected "to attempt
in good faith to effectuate a prompq
fur, and equitable settlement" of the
claims when liability was reasonably
clear. The issue became whether
attorney fees are tecoverable as dam-
ages in an action brought under
Montana's Unfair Trade Practices
Act, $$ 33-18-201, and242, MCA.
The court held that attorney fees are
not recoverable as an element of
damages under Montana's UTPA.
The coutt teasoned that, in civil
Jitigation, Montana follows the
"Amedcan Rule" that, absent a, stat-
ute or contract that allows attorney
fees, each patnl pays their own attor-
ney fees. The court found none of
the four recognized exceptions to the
rule to apply in the case. The court
had akeady held, in Goodouer U,993],
that the "equitable exception," (where
apafty gets attorney fees because it
was forced into a ftivolous lawsuit)
doesn't apply in malicious or bad
faith situations.
Though the court allowed attot-
ney fees to third parties in an insur-
ance declatatory action in Mountain
I7est u. Brewer Q003), it pointed out
that the Samþnn case was not a
declatatory action. The court recog-
ntzed that S 33-18-242, MCA, pro-
vides for recovery of "all. damages
proximately caused" by the insuter's
breach, but noted that the stâtute
did not specify attorney fees, and
the court believed the legislature
could and would have done so if it
meant to allow attorney fees.
Sampson's and Cebulski's $43,000
in attorney fees illustrated pedectly
that, for insureds in bad faith
actions, àttofirey fees could be "all
damages proximately caused." The
court's refusal to allow attorney fees
proximately caused by the insurer's
bad faith conduct as an element of
damages in a third- party statutory
bad faith case was a bitter pill to
swallow.
4. Attorney Fees in the
Underþing Action as Damages in
the Bad Faith Action?
Readers should note that Judge
Sandefur, in Montana's Eighth Judi-
cial District in Jacobren a. Allstatl6 in
2006, raised the possibiliry rhat a
plaintiff in a third-party UTPA action
in Montana may recover attorrìey
fees, incurred in relation to the under-
þing claim, by extension of the equi-
table or insutance exception to the
,{.merican Rule. Sandefut, in denying
Allstate's motion for summary judg-
ment on such attorney fees, noted
that the Montana Supreme Court has
never "squareþ addtessed the issue."
He reasoned that extending the insur-
ance exception to attofney fees suf-
fered by the third parry in the
underþing action (not the UTPA
claim) would do no damage to the
court's holding in Samþson. The case
is on appeal, andLarcy Anderson
has appeared and is briefìng the case
on behalf of the MTI-A. ,\micus
Committee.
C. The Reasonable Basis Defense
Under S 33-18-242(5), MCA
1. Dispute Over Duty as a
Reasonable Basis
Subsection (5) of the UTPA,
S 33-1.8-242, MCA provides a com-
plete defense in a bad faith case to an
insurer which "had a teasonable basis
in law or in fact for contesting the
claim or the amount of the claim, . ."
This subsection has produced and
will continue to ptoduce a parade of
defenses submitted as a reasonable
basis for denying claims. fnsurance
defense counsel have persuaded trial
courts in the state to place on the
interrogatory or special verdict forms
the final question, "Did the defen-
dant (insuret) have a reasonable
basis for contesting the claim or
the amount of the claim?" As has
happened, the jury can answer every
question 'tn favor of the plaintiff and
then answer "yes" to the question of
reasonable basis, and the insurer wins.
Following are cases that shed light on
the reasonable basis defense to ìnsur-
ance bad faith.
Redie¡ u. Attornel Liabiliry Protectioru
Socieflq Q007), involved abadfuth
claim arising out of the handling
of alegù malpractice claim by the
Ättorneys LiabiÌity Protection Society
(ALPS), a captive legal errors and
omjssions insurer. Janet Redies filed
suit against ALPS alleging that the
compâny had engaged in unfair trade
practices by failing to promptly settle
alegal malpractice action she had
brought against one of ALP's lawyer
insureds two years eather. Redies had
suffeted btain damage in a bicycling
accident and was, at or:'e point, so
disabled that her family had a perma-
nent conservator appointed for her
substantial assets. The lawyer hired
by the conservator for the estate
recommended disposing of all het
assets so that she would qualify for
Medicaid and SSI coverage. The
conservator did sq but, Redies even-
tuah recovered to the point that she
was able to handle her own business
affa¡¡¡s. $7hen she realized that her
assets had been disposed of and that
the lawyer could have recornmended
a "self suffìciency ttust" that would
have allowed her to retain the assets
and still get the Medicaid and SSI, she
brought a clasm against the lawyer
who advised disposing of the assets.
Redies'lawyer sent an evaluation
of liability in the case against ALPS's
insured to,{.LPS. ,\LPS in tutn
commissioned its own professional
evaluation of Redies'claims. That
evaluation raised several potential
defenses most importarrt of which
was the possibility that, under Mon-
tanalaw, Redies might not be consid-
ered the client of the lawyer hired by
the conservator. ÂLPS immediately
denied üability, and Redies filed suit
against the lawyer allegrng negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty. The
district court ruled on summary judg-
ment that the lawyer owed Redies a
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duty of care as a matter of law, and
later, the parties settled.
Redies btought suit against ALPS
alleging statutory violations of the
UTPA, S 33-18-201, MCA, and for
breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair deaüng in failing to
settle her claims. ,A.LPS principle
defense was that ithad "a reasonable
basis in law ot in fact for contestìng
the claim" under $ 33-18-242(5), MCÄ.
A key issue in the case was
whether the "reasonable basis in law
or in fact" defense is a question of
fact ot law. The Montana Supreme
Court said, "ffihìle the assessment
of reasonableness generally is within
the province of the jury (or the court
acting as fact-finder), Dean,263
Mont. at 389, 896 P.2d at 258,
reasonableness is a question of law
for the corüt to determine rvhen it
depends entireþ on interpreting rel-
evant legal precedents and evaluating
the insuret's proffered defense under
those ptecedents."
The court reasoned that this is in
keeping with the pdncþle that the
jury does not decide or determine the
law and also honors the statute which
provides that-."Ân insurer may not be
held liable under this section if the
insurer had a reasonable basis in
law. . . for contesting the claim or
the amount of the clairn." S 33-18-
242(5), MCÁ..
The second issue was whether, at
the time ALPS evaluated the claim
against its insured, ithad a reasonable
basis fot beìieving that the insured
did not owe a duty of care to Redies
as a client. The court held ALPS had
a reasonat:.le basis at that time for
beJieving that its insuted lawyet owed
no duty to Redies as a client. The
court reasoned that the frst thing a
claimant in a ptofessional malpractice
suit must establish is that the profes-
sional owed het a duty. At the time
of evaluation, there was no Montana
law recognving any duty of the
attotney to the beneficiary of the
conservatorship but only to the
consetvatoÍ and estate. Hence, the
insurer may raise issue of whether
any duty is owed as a teasonable basis
fot denying coverage or a benefit.
2. Defense Vetdict Not Conclusive
on rtReasonable Basistt Defense
In Craf u. Continental l%estern
Irusurance ConparEas Q004), the ques-
tion was whether one can bring an
action against the third-party insurer
for violation of the UTPA if the
insurer prevailed in the underþing
action? Graf was stopped at a aaffic
light in Great Falls when a semi-
tractor owned by Goosebill Ranch
and pulling two tailers was unable to
stop on a downgrade, ran through
two red lights, and caused a multiple
car collision -j*i.g Gtaf. Goosebill's
insurer, Continental, took what looked
like an unreasonable position that
liability was not reasonably clear based
on the opinions of its ttucking expert.
Graf's pretrial motion for summary
judgment on liability was denied, and
the juty refirrned a defense verdict.
Subsequently, another victim of the
same accident, Cloutier, sued. At the
end of the evidence, Cloutier was
granted a directed verdict that
Goosebill was negligent as a matter of
law, and the jury returned a verdict
for damages. Graf then settled on
appeù, reserving an action for "bad.
faith" against Continental. Graf sued
Continental for bad faith, and the
company atgued it had, by reason of
the verdict favorable to its insureds,
the statutory "reasonable basis"
defense to the UTPA claim.
Flowever, on appeal, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that a de-
fense jury verdict in the underþing
suit does not, as a màtter of law,
establish a "reasonable basis" defense
under the UTPr\. The court noted
that the issues in the UTPÂ claim
and the undedying clalrm are separate
and distinct, i.e., whether the
tortfeasor negligently caused the
accident as opposed to whether the
insurance carircr conducted a feason-
able investigation and attempted in
good faith to effectuate settlement of
the claim when liability had become
reasonably clear. "The UTPA stan-
dards focus on what the insurer
knows at a paraatlar point in rime-
before trial, dudng the investigative
settlement stage." * * * <(The UTPA
is desþed to address these very
inquiries; that is, was there a reason-
able investigation and did the insurer
make a good faith attempt to effectu-
ate a prompt and far settlement of a
claim in which liability had become
reasonably cleat?" Äccordingly, the
defense verdict in the undedþg suit
does not collaterally estop the UTPA
claìm, because estoppel tequites that
the issues be identical, Hence, the
insuter can commit bad faith in its
handling of the claim even if its final
conclusion is correct and the jury in
the underþing case agrees.
3. Reiecting "Comparative Bad
Faith" as a "Reasonable Basistt
Defense
The court has also dealt with the
question of whether the insurer can
claim as its "reasonable basis" com-
paratle bad faith on the part of the
insured. ,\s repoted in the eadier
article on bad faith, the court in
StEhens u. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,ae
held the contract between an insured
and insurer to be a "special relation-
ship" that would support a clatm for
bad faith. The court said:
[fnsutance companies have a
duty to act in good faith with
theit insureds, and this duty
exists independent of the ìn-
surance conftact and indepen-
dent of statute. If this duty is
breached the cause of action
of the insured against the in-
suret sounds in tort.
However, the court in Stephen:,
held that, because the insured owes
no such duty to the insurer, the
insured cannot act in bad faith.
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In Barton a. Moantairu lYest Farm
Bareaa Mat. Ins. Co.so (2003), in a
bad faith case, federal Judge Molloy
refused to recognize "comparative bad
faith" as a "teasonable basis" for the
ìnsuter's denial of the claim,
Burton was injuted as a pâssenger
'tn a cat driven by Truscott and insured
by Mountain SØest. After he settled
with Ttuscott, he asserted a frst-party
claim against Mountain Iü(/est for fail-
ing to inform hlm that the Medical Pay
coverages on each of Truscott's three
other cars were available to him. He
asserted third-party claims that the
insuter made him 
^gree 
tlnat rhe
stacked medical payments constituted
an advance agaìnst any future recov-
ery, and that it failed to farly and
promptly investigate his claim. The
fìrst-party claims arose under the
Unfair Claims Settlement Ptactices
Act, MC,{ S 33-18-201 and.242.The
third party claim was a common law
insurance bad faith claim. Mountain
SØest plead a Second Affirmative De-
fense that Burton's recovery under the
common law bad faith claim is limited
by "comparative l¡ad fatth" and argued
that Burton's frst- and third-party
claims sound in tort.
The Federal District Court
granted Burton's motion to strike
the comparative bad fatth afîttmaave
defense asserting that plaintiff's con-
duct is only a defense if it is a cause
of his damage, not if it is part of the
insurer's "reasonable basis" for tefus-
ing to pay the claim. Judge Molloy
said, if the plaintiff owed and
bteached a dtÍy to the insurer, the
insurer could file a counterclaim
and meet its burden of proving
duty, breach, cause and damage. The
insurer can also adequately defend
itself by presenting Burton's conduct
as a reasonable factual scenario.
4. Timeliness as a "Reasonable
Basis" for Defense
The UTPA requires that the
insurer "promptly" act upon claim
communications, settle claims, and
ptovide a reasonable explanation for
denial of claims. Hence unreasonable
delay in performing those functions
is a common basis for complaints of
bad faith in claims handling. In 2001,
the court in Ensq u. Colorado Casaøþf|
provided some guidance as to
whether delay is reasonable.
Ensey, an independent drywall
contractor who fell from aladder
at a construction site, sought advance
payment of medical and living
expenses. Colorado Casualty immedi-
ately responded that it was investigat-
ing, and their attorney sent a lettet
11 days after the demand confìtming
representation of the cariter and
intent to respond. Eight weeks after
the initial demand, Colorado
Casualty's attorrrcy sent a letter refus-
ing the advances on the ground that
liability was not reasonably clear.
Defense counsel indicated that inves-
tigation revealed that other appropd-
ate devices were available to safely
perform the work but that Ensey
chose not to use them.
The Montana Supreme Court,
when presented with the question of
whether the insurer's response vio-
lated the MUTPA, held that it did
not. It said the letter from the defense
attorney met the Unfair TradePrac-
tices Act requirement that the insurer
"promptly provide a teasonable ex-
planation of the basis in the insut-
ance policy in relation to the facts or
appJicable law for denial of a clasrn
or for the offer of a compromise
settlement." The court noted that
the insurer informed the claimant of
(1) the legal basis for its denial (that
liabiJity was not teasonably clear),
(2) the factual basis for its conclusion
that liability wâs not reasonably clear
(other appropriate devices were avail-
able to safely perform the worþ but
clatmant chose not to use them), and
(3) promptty informed clairnant that
it was denying the claim. The coutt
did not seem concerned by the fact
that the insuret's response to a request
fot advance payment of medical
expenses was made two months and
one week aftet the request.
D. Other Bad Faith Developments
1. ERISA Preemption of Montana
Bad Faith Law
The bane of existence for insur-
ance claimant's counsel is ERISA, the
Employment Retirement Income
Security Âct passed by Congress in
1,974.s2 Congress wanted to encour-
age employers to provide health and
disability insurance plans for their
employees. In essence, one of the
promises embodied in the legislation
is that, if the employer provides such
^ 
pla;n, plan beneficiaries enforcing
promises under the policies would be
limited to remedies set forth in
ERISA and prohibited ftom using
state law remedies. Consequently, a
set of inadequate remedies in the
federal statutes displaced effective
state remedies such as insurance bad
faith claims and punitive damages.
Realistically, there ate no effective
remedies for the plan claimant when
the employer's insuter wrongly re-
fuses to pay for a $7,000 medical
procedure. The plan claimant might
win a bteach of contract clum after
three years of litigation and be
awarded $7,000 plus interest and a
chance of getting a modest awatd of
attorney fees. This provides little
incentive to the insuter to timely or
fa:rly pay claims.
However, this congressional
mandate is in conflict with
McCa¡ran-Fergr-rson Act,53 the foun-
dation of insurance regulation, which
n 1947 established that the "business
of insurance" would be regulated by
the states and not the federal govern-
ment. Hence, Congress fìtted ERISA
v¡ith a "savings clause" that allows
state laws that regulate insurance to
operate regardless of ERISlfs prohi-
bitions. For counsel desperate to have
an adequate remedy for wrongful
conduct of an employment-based
insurer protected by ERIS,A., this
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presented the possible argument that
an insurance bad faith claim was
actually state regulation of insurance
and not, therefore, prohibited by
ERISA. The argument is that statu-
tory and common law bad faith
claims are state regulation of insut-
ance and therefore exempt from the
prohibitions of ERISA, an idea that
seems most logical to counsel who
have spent their careers requiring
insurers to keep their ptomises and
conduct themselves by certain stan-
dards.
Hence, in Elliot u. Fortis Benefts
Ins. Co.sa Q001), brought inJudge
Cebull's court in the Montana
Federal District, counsel pressed
the atgument that the remedy of an
independent action under S 33-18-
M.Ì,t-çih
Iuc*r
242,MCA, is "regulation of insur-
ance" which is not preempted by
ERIS,A.. The insurer, Fortis, denied
disability benefits to a paralegal em-
ployee, Stephanie Elliot, who was in
complete temission from breast can-
cer at the time she appJied for disabil-
ity insurance. \Øhen the cancer
recutted and Elliot filed a claim for
disability benefits, Fortis denied the
claim alleging she had a preexisting
condition. Elliot pressed an "inde-
pendent action" against Fortis under
S 33-1.8-242, MCÂ, for violations of
the Montana UTPA.
However, the court held that
insurance claims arising under
Montana's UTPA, $ 33-18-201 and
242,ll4CA, against ERISA plans are
preempted by the "broad sweep" of
ERIS,\s preemption clause, 29 U.S.C.
S 1144 (a). The court confrmed that
ERISA has a savings clause for "any
law of any state which regulates in-
surance"55 and found that the UTPA
is a form of "regulation." But, Judge
Cebull held that this was not the
"business of insutance" as used in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and,
therefore, not saved. The factors the
U.S. Supreme Coutt has determined
decide whether a màtter regulated
by state statute is the "business of
insufance" afe:s6
(1) whether the state law at
issue has the effect of transfer-
dng or spreading a policy
holder's risk.
(2) whether the state law is
"an integrd. patt of the poJicy
relationship between the
insurer and the insuted."
(3) whether the rule is.limited
to entities within the insurance
industry.
Judge Cebull, followed Ninth
Circuit precedent of Crean1 u.
lØestern Farzz Børeaø Life Ins. Co.s1
(1,992), which had akeady held that
"Montana U nfau Claims Settlement
Practices statutes do not 'regulate
insurance' as discussed in fthe savings
clause], but are civil enforcement
provisions." Accordingly, he found
that the UTPA does not regulate the
"business of insurance," and does
not then fall into the savings clause
of ERISA. Therefore, the UTPA is
preempted under ERISA plans, and
Montanans under ERISA plans lose
the benefìt of this state's signifìcant
body of bad faith lav¡.
2. The Guaranty Fund Gets
Immunity from Bad Faith
In 2007, the court ded that the
Montana Insutance Guaranty Asso-
ciation (I\4IGÁ.) is not subject to
claims for bad faith for its handling
of claims undet the goaranty fund. In
Boettcher u. Montana Gaaranty Fønd,s8
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Boettcher shattered both heels while
painting l(aste's commercial buitding.
I(aste's insurer, Legion Insurance
Company, became insolvent, and
Boettchet's claim was handled by the
MIGA. \ùTestern Guaranty Fund Ser-
vices and its adjuster, Reed, handled
claim administration for MIGÂ.
MIGA ultimateþ paid Boettcher the
$300,000 statutory limit from the
g)ar^flty fund, but Boettcher alleged
that MIGA engaged in a two-year
delay, withheld payment and required
unnecessary litigation causing
Boettcher to incur substantial attor-
ney fees.
Boettcher filed a àeclantory
action seeking a ruling rhatt 1) MIGA
has all the rights, duties, and obliga-
tions of the insolvent insuret includ-
ing statutory and common law
obligations of good fatú;2) limits of
äability of MIGA under the gm nty
fund act apply only to its contractual
obligations and not to "extra contrac-
tual" obligations like insurance bad
faith claims; 3) persons hired to
administeÍ claims on behalf of
MIGA are not protected from liabil-
ity by the act; 4) any immunity fot
"exúa contràc1c)af" claims granted
to MIGA violates equal protection
and due process under the state and
federal constitutions.
The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to MIGA, !(/estern
Guaranty, and Reed on the ground
that the S 33-10-110, MCA granted
them immunity from all such liability.
On appeal, the court held that the
Gaaranty Fund (À4IGA) is protected
by $ 33-10-110 from liability for
statutofy of common law bad taith
claims. However, it also held that the
2001.Guannry Fund statute did not
protect claims adiusters and adminis-
trators from liabiJity for statutory and
comrnon law bad faith claims, The
court's reasoning was that S 33-10-
110, MC,\ Q0i01), provides that there
is no liability on the paft of, and that
no cause of acrion of any nature may
be brought against "any member
insurer, the association or its produc-
ers or employees, the board of di-
rectors, ot the commissioner or his
representatives. . ." The immunity
given applies to'!any action taken by
them in the performance of their
powers and duties under this part."
The coutt in Howell u. Glacier General
In¡. Co. (1,994)se had determined that
MIGr\s duty was to pay "covered
claims" as defìned by statute and held
that covered claims did not include
claims for attorney fees. MIGA
stands in the shoes of the insolvent
insurer only to the extent of the
insurer's obJigation to pay "covered
claims" and not to the extent the
insurer would be liable fot bad faith.
Therefore, statutofy of commofl
law bad faith claims fall outside the
defìnition of "covered claims" in
533-10-102(2)(a), MCA.
Howevet, the court also held the
statutory immunity gnnted the fund
extends to "insurance producers or
employees" but not to claims adjust-
ers and administrators who cannot be
read into the statute. Consequently,
summary judgment for'SØestern
Guaranq and Reed was tevetsed,
and the claims for bad faith against
them were remanded. We should
note that the court declined to decide
whether the statutory immunity vio-
lates substantive due process or
equal protection as that issue was
not perfected for appeal.
3. The Statute of Limitations Trap
in Bad Faith Cases
The 2004 case of O'Connor u.
National Uruion Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
bargh, PA,60 illustrates the danger and
unfairness inherent in the legislature's
specifìcation of differing statutes of
limitations when it enacted S 33-18-
2a2 Q)@) & (b), MCA. Subsection (a)
dictated that the statute of limitations
fot an "insufed" commenced "witlin
2 yearc from the date of the violation
of 33-18-201," while Subsection þ)
said that, for a "rhird-party cldtrnanÍ.,"
the statute commenced "within 1
yeat from the date of the settlement
of or the entry of judgment on the
undeding claim." Hence, both the
periods and the events that trþger
the clock are very different for frst-
party and third-patty claimants.
O'Connor suffered a back
injury in a workplace slip-and-fall at
ìflal-Mart in Billings in August 1993.
She won a lØorkers' Compensation
Court ordet that the catiet pay for a
sufgery and provide temporary total
disability benefìts in May 1995. There
was no final settlement or judgment
of permanent disability at that time.
In October 1996, O'Connor filed
a fedeøl action for violation of the
UTPA for denying her claim and
delayrng her surgety. The claim was
dismissed as premature under $ 33-
18-242(5)þ), MCÂ., which forbids a
third party from filing "aÍt actrott
under this section until aftet the
underþing claim has been settled or
a judgment entered in favor of the
clatmant on the undedying claim."
(f.lote that O'Connor was a third-
paty clatmant, the wotkets' comp
insurer being the liability insuret for
her employer.)
After Breaington (1.999), held that
thkd-party common law bad faith
still existed, O'Connor agnn f:Jed a
fedetal UTPA and common law bad
faith claim. However, the federal
court, interpreted Brewingtolt to meàrr
each interim judgment on work comp
benefìts was an "underþing clum"
which had therefote started the stat-
ute to run in May 1995. The court
dismissed for statute of limitations,
and, on apped,, the Ninth Circuit
certified the following question to the
Montana Supreme Court.
For statute of limitations
purposes, do statutory and
common law bad faith claims
against an insurer, predicated
on actions taken in the adjust-
ment of a workets' compensa-
tion claim, accllre when the
Montana \ü/orkets' Compensa-
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tion Court enters a judgment
ordering the insuter to pay for
a previously denied benefit,
but leaves unresolved the ulti-
mate determinations of the
extent and duration of the
worker's disability?
The court held that the statute
was triggered on entry of judgment
on benefìts by the Nlorker Compensa-
tion Court. The coutt noted that a
third-party bad faith claim may not be
brought under the MUTPA "until
after the underþing claim has been
settled or a judgment entered in favor
of the claimant on the undeding
c1affi."61 Hovzever, the MUTPA does
not define "underþing settlement."
The court synthesized the prior con-
trolling cases of Creq(1990), Poteat
(1,996) and Breaington (1.999),|ry
saying "we detetmine the accrual date
of a bad fa:th clatm arising out of a
sepàràte and independent disputed
issue by determining whether that
particular issue has been ultimately
resolved, tegatdless of the existence
ot absence of a resolution of other
issues within the workets' compensa-
tion case." The court agreed with the
defendant insurer that "[S]tatutory
and common law bad faith claims
arising out of the handling of work-
efs' compensation claims accfue at
the time each individual dispute
grving rise to the bad faith claim is
tesolved by settlement or WCC judg-
ment regardless of whether other
issues remain in dispute in the work-
ers' compensation case." The coutt
found the rule against allowing a bad
faith action to proceed at the same
time as the underþing action in civil
case set forth in Fode (1.986) to be
distinguishable on the ground that
Fode wasn't a workers' compensation
case and "of limited relevance" in
Jight of Cren7, Poteøt, and Brewington.
Justices Cotter, Leaphart, and
Regnier dissented that v/ork comp
bad faith needs a "bright line" and
that it should be the point in the
overall claim where liability and
extent and duration of disability have
been resolved by judgment or settle-
ment. They predict that "claimants
will be required to fìle a cause of
action covering any perceived act of
bad faith that occurred prior to entry
of each interim judgme¡1." * * *
"The insurer's course of conduct will
have to be broken into artificial
subsets for each successive bad faith
lawsuit. * * * the court will have to
figure out what portion of the claims'
file of the insurer should be pro-
duced in discovery..." The O'Connor
case's interpretation of the arbitrary
time limits and trþgers of $ 33-19-
2a2(7)(a) & (b), MCA, is frightening
for even the most carcful attorneys.
4. Who is a Third Patty fot Third-
Party Actions
American Financial, Inc. f/k/a First
National, Inc. u. Americøn Statu Ins.
C0.62 Q}}l),limited v¡ho could be a
"thfud patr/' for purposes of a bad
faith claim at common law or under
the statute, S 33-18-201, MCA. The
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court held that, in order to bring a
third-party bad faith claim, one must
show "that they were a third-party
claimant on the liability policy in the
underþing case" and that, "because of
the wrongful denial of coverage by the
insuter, the thfud party \Mas injured."
,\merican Financial, Inc. (f/k/a
First National, Inc.) was a lender
advising the ìíest Yellowstone School
District which was building a new
school. The lender recommended that
the project architects be included as
additional insureds on a $2,000,000
policy they recommended be required
of the general contractor. After
review of the appropriate insurance
certificate, ¿\merican advised the
school district that the architects were
insured as reconìrnended. \X/hen
desþ and construction problems
developed, the school district made
demands on ASI for negligence of
the conffactot, Beck, and the archi-
tects. ASI wrongly denied coverage
for the architects claiming ÂSI nevet
received the Certifìcate of Insurance
naming the architects as additional
insuteds and that an endorsement to
ÂSI's policy excluded professional
negligence.
The school district sued the
insurer and amended to name the
Iender, American Financial fot negli-
gently advising them that the archi-
tects were covered. Howevef,
discovery disclosed that an ,{SI
employee had in fact received the
certifìcate. Also the court ruled that
the endorsement r\SI issued and
backdated was void. American Finan-
cial then successfully moved for
surnmary judgment on the negligence
claim against it on the ground that
the school disttict had acua)Iy
received the coverage and advice
sought from ASI.
,A.merican Financial then sued
ASI on multiple claims including
commorl law bad faith. '{,SI moved
for summary judgment on the ground
that American Financial was not a
"thkd pargl' that could bring a bad
faith claim at common law or under
the statute, The agreed reasoning
that "Extending third-party status to
peripheral panies affected by the
denial of coverage, but who were not
themselves a clasmant against the
liabiJity poJicy, would lead to a result
where potentially anyone impacted by
a bad faith deniai of coverage could
sue the insurance company." The
court distinguished O'Fallon (À4ont.
1993) in which the claimants were the
ddver and passenger injured in an
accident with the insured paty and
pressing claims under that insured's
policy before bringing a claim against
that insurer. The court could fìnd no
authority for extending the third party
status to ,{.merican Financial.
5. Evidence in the Statutory Bad
Faith Action
The Federal District Court in
Montana has taken a little of the
sting out of the fact that only certain
kinds of insurer conduct prohibited
by the UTPA, S 33-18-201, MCA are
actionable under $ 33-1.8-242, MCÂ.
Judge Molloy held in lYest u. State
Farm Mat. Aato. Ins. C0.63 Q000), rhat
evidence relating to those subsections
of the Unfair Claims Setdement
Practices Act, $ 33-1,8-201., MCA,
that do not support an independent
cause of action under $ 33-18-242,
MCA, may stiÌl be admissible to
prove subsections that do support
an independent cause.
For over a yeaÍ, State Farm made
no offer in response to West's de-
mand fot her UIM limits. \7est filed a
federal complaint alleging numerous
breaches of the Unfait Claims Settle-
ment Ptactices Act, S 33-18-201,
MCrA., some of which gave rise to
independent causes of action under $
33-1,8-242, MC,\. She also alleged the
following breaches of 201. that did
not support causes of action under
242:
** Compelling her to institute
lirigation thtough its penurious
policies by offering an inap-
propriately low amount in
s ettlement (33 -1,8-2U, m)
** Failing to provide a reason-
able explanation for its refusal
to pay Q01l14l)
i'* Failing to acknowledge and
act promptly upon her com-
munications Q)ll2l)
** Failing to adopt and imple-
ment reasonable standards for
prompt claims invesrigation
(201,131)
State Farm moved for summary
judgment and motion in limine to
block any evidence of those claims
that did not support independent
causes of action, and Judge Molloy
refused. He found the standard to be
whether the conduct alleged in the
claims that do not support the action
is relevant to the claims that do sup-
port the action. Flence, if one can
show relevance, one can successfully
offer evidence that worit support a
claim under S 33-1.8-242, MCA. This
may allow the claimant to develop for
the juty the whole picture of the
insuter's misconduct.
III. Conclusion
It is likeþ that the turbulence in
development of insurance bad faith
btought on by the legislatute's
enactment of $ 33-18-242,i[l4c1' in
1987 is settling. Montana's bad faith
structufe with its frst-party statutofy
independent actions and thitd-patty
corrurìon law and statutory actions is
likely here to stay. Litigation of what
constitutes a "reasonable basis"
defense for insurets will continue,
while claimants will struggle with
restrictions on âttorney fees in bad
faith actions. As always, insurance
bad faith law is only as good as the
remedies it provides for enforcement.
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